Class Acts

Let us explore one of the political implications of all this, namely, community groups. The internet is not the first institution to be accused of bringing out and reinforcing dreadfully individualistic tendencies. American democracy itself has always been seen as a rather unfortunate feeder of over-individualism, as well as tyranny of the majority (although checks and balances have served us fairly well on that front). Does the internet only ingrain these problems, or can it offer a way to solve or at least bypass them? According to the almighty Wikipedia, Tocqueville thought that association, the coming together of people for common purpose, would bind Americans to an idea of nation larger than selfish desires, thus making a civil society which wasn’t exclusively dependent on the state.

Wellman points out ways in which networked individualism can help at least some sociopolitical problems: “At times, the Internet’s lack of communicative richness can foster contact with more diverse others. The lack of social and physical cues on-line makes it difficult to find out if another online community member has similar social characteristics or attractive physical characteristics. Asynchronous communication gives participants more control over the timing and content of their self-disclosures. This allows specialized relationships to develop from shared interests rather than be stunted at the onset by differences in social status. This focus on shared interests rather than on similar characteristics can be especially empowering for members of lower-status and disenfranchised groups.” For my part, I see the internet as being more shaped by our “selfish desires” than ameliorating them. However, it is one of the most important institutions that is both unusually free from the controls of the government and is a thriving civil society thriving because of it.

An online presence is basically the inputs and reputation(s) that a person has online: the sum of their activities trackable to certain online roles or avatars. Note the incompleteness of such an identity: Wellman asks, “Will networked individualism deconstruct holistic individual identities? A person would become the sum of her roles, and need to present multiple personas to the world. This compartmentalization of personal life—within the household, at work, and in communities — may create insecure milieus where people do not fully know each other.” This is a fairly straighforward question that nevertheless has no clear way of judging an answer.

In what ways is an online identity different from an identity as a member of offline communities? Entry and exit costs are a point worth considering. Many online communities, for example a collection of people who routinely post on a message board or blog, have very low entry and exit costs. They are open for anyone to join, whether in a reading or contributing capacity. Individuals will post often and make their name recognizable for a while, and then drop out without explanation. For those who make (or aspire to make) a living or a serious pursuit out of internet contribution, consistent and popular contributions are a must; but in the majority of cases, people contribute for fun and abruptly stop when it is no longer fun or affordable. Among those who have the technology, time and interest are the limiting elements here, not usually money or social bonds; and time and interest are volatile and personal things. Online anonymity is almost a kind of Ring of Gyges, in that it separates consequences from social behavior and standing. Its results in internet society are, on the one hand, flame wars, spam, and a certain level of disconnect, since people cannot be trusted as easily to fulfill commitments; but on the other hand, a new level of personal pride that manifests itself in grammar nazis, Wikipedia editors, and collective rating efforts like Digg that place trust in large numbers of people to display good sense in very limited and specific roles. This kind of participation has instilled into users an individual sense of duty to impartiality and accuracy rather than mere opinion, in the case of Wikipedia; and a gratifying sense of taste sharing and mutual informing in the case of Digg.

Wellman talks about handling conflicts in his three models: in Little Boxes, solutions include coup, revolt, and irrevocable departure; in Glocalization, back-biting and keeping distance; and in Networked Individualism, avoidance and exit. This reflects the decreasing exit costs associated with increasing despatialization and choice over where and how one interacts with people. However, Wellman claims that when going in that direction, the cost of entry actually increases – or at least, joining in becomes harder due to interactions being harder to observe. Although I might agree that on a hypothetical level, access can be more thoroughly restricted when random in-person encounters are ruled out, on a practical level, one’s overall joining-in options are nevertheless expanded greatly due to more content and groups if nothing else. The shockingly wide range of anonymous-friendly or simple to enter communities supports me here, I believe.

While Wellman argues that the current Glocalization is giving way to a global, information-based Networked Individualism, I am not convinced that “meatspace” is becoming obsolete. Instead, I see that while mobile technology is indeed allowing for a nonspatial social scene, people are quickly finding new ways to link previously detatched information to locations. These locations are not always local, so it is still a sign of increased globalization; but I think that the still-recent lack of adequate mapping technology gave a false sense, for a while, that people no longer cared about place.

One fascinating local tool is a Google Maps application called the Gmaps Pedometer. You can trace a jogging or biking route on the map, and it will calculate cumulative mileage, calories burned, and even when to take rests. This popular new application is intensely local and spatial, when used for the intended purpose, and requires more physical activity than most of us are comfortable with. A shocking departure from pure bytes, indeed. Sites like Freecycle and Craigslist rely on location to organize transactions, though it’s true that such deals are more interest-related and less face-to-face activities than walking into a store or going jogging. Google Maps mashups are existent or certainly forthcoming for Freecycle, Craigslist, Ebay, etc, further allowing for a more visual and spatial organization of location data.

On the global side, map mashups are quicky proliferating as a tool for awareness, journalism, and political lobbying. The Tunisian Prison Map was somewhat of a landmark in political mashup history (as recent as it has been!). Another interesting case is Greenpeace France’s Genetically Engineered Corn Google Maps mashup. After the French Government banned the mashup, Greenpeace France created crop circle symbols to mark the sites in real life. The interplay between online and offline information is becoming more graceful, more common, more suited to the needs of the people, and more easily authored by laymen. Map mashups are, after all, a Web 2.0 phenomenon.

One final example is Facebook. Facebook is often touted as a superior social networking application to Myspace and others because it has different kinds and levels of networks within it, and privacy controls for each. A user can belong to up to five networks, though most only belong to one or two. Networks are available for colleges, high schools, companies, and regions. Events, groups, and other tools can be specified as pertaining to specific networks. People are eagerly rushing to define themselves not just by their interests, but by their geographical communities and the things they see every day in the real world. This is another sign that while people are becoming less dependent on location in order to communicate, one important aspect of themselves as a person that they want to communicate is location. This seemingly enduring importance of physical and spatial identity in the human psyche should be reassuring to those who, like me, need to be reminded that they are not defined solely by their online presence.

Next (or soon thereafter): what is an “online presence” anyway?

This post will describe some themes brought up by Barry Wellman, a professor at the University of Toronto, in his essay “Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked Individualism.” Following posts will examine some issues raised by the article.

Wellman presents three models of social and work community interaction. Little boxes is a model that describes traditional, face-to-face, spatially-dependent modes of communication and interaction. Examples include office meetings, block parties, and neighborhood homeowners’ associations.

Glocalization is what Wellman terms the contemporary hybridization and intersection of spatial and nonspatial networks. Even use of the internet has a spatial component to it, since most people use the internet from a computer they keep at home, school, or the office. When you instant message someone, you can expect them to be at one of these places; even their away message might specify where they are. Wired phones are another example of place-to-place communication.

Networked Individualism is, as Wellman describes it, the resultant and emerging nonspatial extreme. This is true person-to-person contact according to Wellman, which brings up the question of what a person really is. Certainly this kind of ‘person’al interaction is free of many potential biases and distractions, such as appearance, accent, or social standing, that are to some degree peripheral to what a person really feels represents himself. Mobile technology as well as increasing personal travel and mobility is stripping our identities of their roots in places, and emphasizing our identities as we choose to express them through an increasingly widening range of mobile media, though text content is still the predominant way of expressing oneself on the internet.

These three modes of communication are all relevant for the three kinds of online community that I talked about in my last post. Wellman’s are categories of those to whom we network, and the means of communication by which we do it; mine are categories of purposes for which we network, and the motivations and goals thereof.

It seems to me there are three kinds of online community.

First, there’s a sort of nebulous community brought together by interest – say, a blog with its regular commenters. The people there don’t meet physically or even necessarily have a stated goal – just a shared interest. But they get to know each other, and build off of each other’s contribution.

Second, there’s online communities devoted to some goal, for instance activist communities. This might include things like Indymedia, where there’s accountability and leadership structure but no set schedule of contribution. Another one is a group called Critical Mass – I was on their listserv for a while – and what they do is get people together to bike in DC. It’s really something of a protest, since DC is pretty unfriendly toward bicycles, and they certainly had to talk over issues like safety, dealing with cops, regrouping if you get scattered, etc. as well as what their goal was: whether they were going to follow all the laws or not.

Third, there are companies and full-time, established NGOs who work pretty nuch like a normal organization, with a hierarchy, payroll, meetings, and a work day, even if it’s not 9 to 5.

So let’s look at the most nebulous kind first, because this is where people’s motivations and identities are most purely influenced by the internet structure.

When you get on the internet, why do you do contribute? What’s your motivation? Because it’s fun. You update your Facebook profile, write a blog entry, comment on someone else’s blog, edit a Wikipedia article, and post a YouTube video of something you and your friends put together. You do all these things because it’s fun. And the result is your friends can know more about you, or other people in a community can get an impression of you and your opinions, or you can feel the satisfaction of improving something. All fun.

Let’s look at how individuals and communities form on the internet. And yes, I would say that individuals “form” on the internet, because who you “are” there is just whoever you present yourself to be. It’s your profile, your avatar, as it’s known in some groups. Building up an online identity – real or projected – by producing information or commentary establishes a personal connection, fan club, style, etc. which keeps attention. And when you can express yourself and people pay attention, it’s gratifying. That’s a large reason why people do it. Status, reputation.

Of community participation: It’s easier to find a community, easier to participate, easier to build up a reputation simply by participating more than everyone else. But it’s also simple to drop away: people don’t have the social expectations of formality and politeness, or giving reasons why you’re suddenly never on the net, that are expected in the real world. It’s still a community endeavor, but the individual is even more fully in control of how much, when, and why they participate. A sense of entitlement to privacy, ironically.

Julia here. By way of introduction, computer appreciator, identity explorer, sometime activist, and Government major.

One theme I hope to focus on is how technology, particularly the internet, allows for new kinds of communities and bonds to form. What are the characteristics of some of these new networks? How do they compare to and interact with older forms of community, including countries?

Before I get to that, though, a quick look at something else from class on September 5th.

Friedman identifies three historical “flattenings” of the world, or revolutions in global interaction. The first involved a geographical expansion and deepening of how countries related to each other. The second was when businesses expanded into global trade relations. The third, which we are witnessing now, is fueled by the ability of individuals to readily interact on a global level.

When trying to determine whether Friedman or Mogler (the dot Communist Manifesto) had a more pertinent view of the process and results of the information revolution, this thought came to mind: If the new mode of production is between individuals, businesses and countries must change to accommodate and deal with individuals. So, you get (not necessarily respectively) both increased IP freedom (Mogler’s unregulated access to free information) and a level playing field (Friedman’s call centers in India and from the home) for all.